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THE NEW COMMON LAW
COURTS, CULTURE, AND THE LOCALIZATION OF THE MODEL PENAL
CODE
ANDERS WALKER♦

ABSTRACT
Few tropes in American law teaching are more firmly
entrenched than the criminal law division between Model Penal
Code and common law states. Yet, even a cursory look at current
state codes indicates that this bifurcation is outmoded. No state
continues to cling to ancient English common law, nor does any
state adhere fully to the Model Penal Code. In fact, those states
that adopted portions of the Code have since produced a substantial
body of case law – what this article terms “new common law” –
transforming it. Taking the controversial position that criminal law
pedagogy is antiquated, this article proposes a radical update,
emphasizing two objectives: 1) the need to stress the interplay
between individual state cases and codes, and 2) the need to
abandon the position that the MPC represents a bold new vision of
criminal law reform, particularly since that vision is itself almost
half a century old.
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To illustrate, this article will proceed in four parts. Part I
interrogates the myth of the “common law” state, showing how
few, if any states continue to abide by judicially created law
heralding from Elizabethan England. Part II interrogates the myth
of the Model Penal Code state, showing how no state adopted the
MPC in its entirety nor did any state adopt its most ambitious
reforms, making the study of the MPC as a free-standing code
misleading. Part III looks even closer at so-called MPC states,
showing how every state that did adopt portions of the Model
Penal Code has since developed its own, new common law
interpreting it. Part IV examines the theoretical implications of
looking more closely at the new common law, arguing that it leads
to a more precise pedagogy, as well as a more empirically-minded,
culturally-rooted understanding of how the criminal law actually
works.
At its core, American criminal law reflects a sedimentary
deposit of localized, state-level, majoritarian politics. While
scholars like William J. Stuntz have derided such politics, even
criticizing them as “pathological,” this paper argues that they are in
fact an inevitable symptom of democratic rule.1 To rail against
them, this piece maintains, is at once anti-democratic and futile.
Even if the drafting of criminal legislation were handed over to
politically insulated experts, as scholars like William Stuntz and
Paul Robinson argue it should be, judges would still bend that law
to conform to majority will, imposing a new common law onto
even the most politically insulated, utilitarian of codes.2
Underlying this article’s endorsement of a new common
law approach to criminal law lies a larger challenge to the political
and pedagogical assumptions underlying legal education generally
in the United States. Perhaps foremost among these assumptions is
the notion that state and local law is somehow less significant, less
interesting, and ultimately less worthy of attention than national
law.3 Put simply, whenever national law can be taught, it is, and
whenever national law cannot be taught – because it does not exist
– then fictional models are used.4 Though convenient for scholars
1

William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law 100 MICH. L.
REV. 505 (2001).
2
William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law 100 MICH. L.
REV. 505 (2001); Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, The Accelerating
Degradation of American Criminal Codes, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 633, 640 (2005).
3
Russell Covey, “Should We Stop Teaching the Model Penal Code?” July 25,
2006, prawfsblawg.com; Douglas Berman, THE MODEL PENAL CODE SECOND:
MIGHT FILM SCHOOLS BE IN NEED OF A REMAKE 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 163
(2004).
4
Russell Covey, “Should We Stop Teaching the Model Penal Code?” July 25,
2006, prawfsblawg.com; Douglas Berman, THE MODEL PENAL CODE SECOND:
MIGHT FILM SCHOOLS BE IN NEED OF A REMAKE 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 163
(2004).
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who look down on state law as inferior, such an approach leads to
imprecision and, this article maintains, a false sense of law’s very
nature.
For example, most casebook authors presume that the fields
of psychology and utilitarian philosophy are best suited for
explaining criminal law and guiding criminal law reform.5 Implicit
in such an approach, however, is the view that democratic
majorities do not, in fact, know what is best for them. Indeed,
some criminal law scholars have made this point explicit, arguing
for the de-politicization of the criminal law-making process.6
While criminal law casebooks reinforce the notion that
electoral majorities are inept, few fields of legal practice rely more
heavily on a lawyer’s ability to understand local majority
sentiment than criminal law.7 Whether experts disprove of average
people or not, it is average people who decide the outcome of
criminal cases, and consequently it is average people who inform
an attorney’s decision to proceed to trial or accept a plea bargain.8
Further, until the moment that criminal law scholars succeed in
overturning democratic government, average people retain the
power to change the law through the electoral process.9 Rather
than emphasize abstract theory then, law students should be
exposed to the methodologies of legal history and legal
anthropology, both of which focus on the ascertainment and
analysis of local practice, local knowledge, and local, community

5

JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 1-2 (5th ed.
2009); CYNTHIA LEE & ANGELA HARRIS, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS (2005); MARKUS D. DUBBER & MARK G. KELMAN, AMERICAN
CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, STATUTES, COMMENTS (2005); PAUL H. ROBINSON,
CRIMINAL LAW: CASE STUDIES AND CONTROVERSIES (2005); JOHN KAPLAN,
ROBERT WEISBERG, GUYORA BINDER, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
(5th ed. 2004); RICHARD J. BONNIE, ANNE M. COUGHLIN, JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR.
& PETER W. LOW, CRIMINAL LAW (2nd ed. 2004); LLOYD L WEINREB, CRIMINAL
LAW: CASES, COMMENTS, QUESTIONS (7th ed. 2003); GEORGE E. DIX AND M.
MICHAEL SHARLOT, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (5th ed., 2002);
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, MODERN CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, COMMENTS AND
QUESTIONS (3rd ed. 2001).
6
William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law 100 MICH. L.
REV. 505 (2001); Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, The Accelerating
Degradation of American Criminal Codes, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 633, 640 (2005).
7
Paul H. Robinson, Why Does the Criminal Law Care What the Layperson
Thinks is Just: Coercive Versus Normative Crime Control 86 VIRGINIA L. REV.
1839 (2000).
8
Paul H. Robinson, Why Does the Criminal Law Care What the Layperson
Thinks is Just: Coercive Versus Normative Crime Control 86 VIRGINIA L. REV.
1839 (2000).
9
Paul H. Robinson, Why Does the Criminal Law Care What the Layperson
Thinks is Just: Coercive Versus Normative Crime Control 86 VIRGINIA L. REV.
1839 (2000).
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norms.10 Unless criminal law scholars accept the relevance of such
methodologies to the explication of their field, law students will
find themselves increasingly deprived of even a basic
understanding of how judicial opinions and legislative actions
operate together to construct and reconstruct criminal offenses.

I. THE MYTH OF THE COMMON LAW STATE
One of the most pervasive shibboleths of American
criminal law courses is the common law state.11 Criminal law
casebooks, hornbooks, and even commercial outlines all agree that
while some states can best be characterized as Model Penal Code
states, others are best designated common law.12 Yet, few agree on
what precisely this means. According to criminal law scholar
Joshua Dressler, for example, common law states originally
followed judge-made crimes deriving from England.13 Yet,
Dressler argues, “most states, often by statute, have abolished
common law crimes,” meaning that even in so-called common law
states, “the legislature is the pre-eminent lawmaking body in the
10

See, e.g. Henry M. Hart, Jr. The Aims of the Criminal Law, in JOSHUA
DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 1-2 (5th ed. 2009);
CYNTHIA LEE & ANGELA HARRIS, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
(2005); MARKUS D. DUBBER & MARK G. KELMAN, AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW:
CASES, STATUTES, COMMENTS (2005); PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW:
CASE STUDIES AND CONTROVERSIES (2005); JOHN KAPLAN, ROBERT WEISBERG,
GUYORA BINDER, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (5th ed. 2004);
RICHARD J. BONNIE, ANNE M. COUGHLIN, JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR. & PETER W.
LOW, CRIMINAL LAW (2nd ed. 2004); LLOYD L WEINREB, CRIMINAL LAW:
CASES, COMMENTS, QUESTIONS (7th ed. 2003); GEORGE E. DIX AND M. MICHAEL
SHARLOT, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (5th ed., 2002); WAYNE R.
LAFAVE, MODERN CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS (3rd ed.
2001); RONALD N. BOYCE, DONALD A. DRIPPS AND ROLLIN M. PERKINS,
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE (9th ed. 2004).
11
See, e.g., STEVEN L. EMANUEL, CRIMINAL LAW (5th ed. 2003) (noting
distinctions between common law and Model Penal Code states on the topics of
mistake, proximate cause, duress, necessity, attempt, conspiracy, and
accomplice liability); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 66 (2nd
ed. 2010); JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 31 (3rd ed.
2001) (considering in detail both the common law and the Model Penal Code).
12
See, e.g., STEVEN L. EMANUEL, CRIMINAL LAW (5th ed. 2003) (noting
distinctions between common law and Model Penal Code states on the topics of
mistake, proximate cause, duress, necessity, attempt, conspiracy, and
accomplice liability); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 66 (2nd
ed. 2010); JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 31 (3rd ed.
2001) (considering in detail both the common law and the Model Penal Code).
13
JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 27 (3rd ed. 2001) (noting
that pursuant to English common law “the definitions of crimes and the rules of
criminal responsibility were promulgated by courts rather than by Parliament.”)
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realm of criminal law,” and that courts do not originate law so
much as interpret it.14
If legislatures are the “pre-eminent” lawmaking bodies in
America, why bother with the fiction of the common law state?
According to some, even though all states boast a criminal code,
some have nevertheless “retained” respect for the ancient common
law, particularly in cases where common law crimes are not
mentioned in state codes.15 If a state has a “reception” statute, in
other words, then prosecutors can successfully charge defendants
with crimes that are not enumerated in their state’s criminal
statutes so long as those crimes are mentioned in Blackstone’s
Commentaries or relate to “an English case directly on point
decided before 1607.”16
How often does this happen? According to Joshua
Dressler, such prosecutions are “rare.”17 Criminal law scholar
Wayne R. LaFave agrees, noting that prosecutions for common
law crimes are not only few and far between, but have tended to
involve idiosyncratic, nineteenth century-style offenses, including
for example “being a common scold,” “maliciously killing a
horse,” and “burning a body in a cellar furnace.”18
Given their rarity, do reception statutes warrant the
attention of first year criminal law students, whose task it is to gain
an introduction to the most important aspects of the criminal law?
Probably not, particularly since the vast majority of states reject
them. However, there remains one more reason why the
pedagogical trope of the common law state may exist. According
to Joshua Dressler, some states have rejected reception statutes but
still “codified the common law felonies,” meaning that they
employ common law terms to explicate their criminal statutes.19
Hence, it is important to retain some memory of the common law,
presumably so that one can understand the law in those states that
codified the common law.
Is this really true? As this section will demonstrate, most
crimes enumerated in American state codes, including classic
common law crimes like murder, possess just as many
distinguishing American characteristics as English ones, rendering
arguments that American students need to understand ancient
English common law nonsensical. Indeed, this section posits that
the only unifying factor shared by so-called common law states is
14

JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 28 (3rd ed. 2001).
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 66 (2nd ed. 2010) (noting
that some states continue to accept the ancient common law of England “either
by an express ‘reception statute’ or without the aid of any statute.”)
16
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 66 (2nd ed. 2010).
17
JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 28 (3rd ed. 2001).
18
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 67 (2nd ed. 2010)
19
JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 28 (3rd ed. 2001).
15
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not whether they preserved retention statutes or codified the
common law, but that they rejected the MPC. Currently, only
fifteen states in the union refused to incorporate any portion of the
Model Penal Code into their statutory criminal law, making all but
one of them, by default, “common law states.”20 Included are
California, Idaho, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Mississippi, Nevada, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, Vermont, West Virginia, Wyoming, and
Louisiana.21 The last state, Louisiana, derives its code directly
from French civil law, meaning that it is perhaps best described as
an indigenous, non-MPC code state than a common law state.22
Perhaps ironically, the remaining fourteen states that
rejected the MPC are all perhaps better described as indigenous
code states than common law states. To illustrate, it is helpful to
look at how those fourteen states that did not adopt the MPC treat
homicide.23 Under English common law, murder was not divided
into degrees, but rather included simple distinctions between
intentional killings done with “malice aforethought,” and
unintentional killings, or manslaughter.24 Yet, out of the fifteen
20

For a compilation of states that adopted the Model Penal Code, see Dannye
Holley, The Influence of the Model Penal Code’s Culpability Provisions on
State Legislatures: A Study of Lost Opportunities, Including Abolishing the
Mistake of Fact Doctrine, 27 SW. U. L. REV. 229 n. 2 (1997).
21
For a compilation of states that adopted the Model Penal Code, see Dannye
Holley, The Influence of the Model Penal Code’s Culpability Provisions on
State Legislatures: A Study of Lost Opportunities, Including Abolishing the
Mistake of Fact Doctrine, 27 SW. U. L. REV. 229 n. 2 (1997).
22
Id.
23
Under English common law, murder originally applied to both intentional and
unintentional killings. In the 1820s, however, Parliament enacted a statute
carving out an exception to murder for cases where defendants claimed benefit
of clergy, creating the statutory lesser-included offense of manslaughter. JOHN
H. LANGBEIN, RENEE LETTOW LERNER, BRUCE P. SMITH, HISTORY OF THE
COMMON LAW: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS
620 (2009). (Describing 9 Geo. IV c. 31, s.9). WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND OF PUBLIC WRONGS 216 (Malcom
Kerr, ed., 1962). While law professors may say that British statutes should be
considered part of the British common law because they come from England,
this confuses the notion of what precisely, the common law is. Is it judge-made
or is it English? Casebook authors maintain that it was judge-made, but in many
cases it was not. This means that it is probably better to think of it simply as
English law. Yet, if it is simply English law, then why not distinguish between
English law – statutory and judge-made – and American law? Of course, to
concede that there may have been an American criminal law that preceded the
Model Penal Code would undermine the assumption, implicit in American
casebooks, that pre-MPC law was an archaic remnant of the eighteenth century,
much in need of an overhaul. However, core aspects of American “common
law” regimes are decidedly American innovations, with little antecedent in
either English law or judge-made law.
24
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND OF
PUBLIC WRONGS 216 (Malcom Kerr, ed., 1962). Incidentally, the history of the
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states that rejected the Model Penal Code, only six employ the
English common law term “malice aforethought.”25
Of those states that continue to employ malice
aforethought, all but one (South Carolina), divide the offense into
first and second degrees, something the English common law did
not do, and subsequently rely on uniquely American language to
ascertain what, precisely, constitutes murder.26 The most common
language cited comes from Pennsylvania, which divided murder
and manslaughter into degrees in 1794, declaring that any killing
done in a “willful, deliberate, or premeditated” manner warranted
classification as murder in the first degree.27
While criminal law casebooks and hornbooks concede that
Pennsylvania has influenced many American states, they continue
to cling to the common law divide, omitting any discussion of
additional non-judge made criteria that so-called common law
states use to determine what precisely constitutes first degree
murder.28 For example, Rhode Island declares that “[t]he unlawful

crime of murder in England raises questions about the extent to which even
English “common law” was court-generated. Prior to the reign of Edward III,
for example, murder in England focused primarily on the killing of Danes by
English natives, a crime for which entire communities could be punished.
Edward changed this policy by statute, introducing the current definition of
killing by “malice aforethought.” WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND OF PUBLIC WRONGS 217 (Malcom Kerr, ed., 1962).
25
The six states are California, Rhode Island, Nevada, Oklahoma,
Massachusetts, and South Carolina. California actually incorporated malice
aforethought after it adopted New York’s Penal Code in 1872. See Sanford H.
Kadish, The Model Penal Code’s Historical Antecedents 19 RUTGERS L.J. 521,
537 (1988). Wyoming uses its own language, combining the Pennsylvania
models premeditation with the English common law’s malice aforethought: 6-2101. Murder in the first degree; penalty.(a) Whoever purposely and with
premeditated malice, or in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, any
sexual assault, sexual abuse of a minor, arson, robbery, burglary, escape,
resisting arrest, kidnapping or abuse of a child under the age of sixteen (16)
years, kills any human being is guilty of murder in the first degree.
26
The only state that does not divide murder into first and second degrees is
South Carolina. S.C. CODE ANN. §16-3-10 (2009).
27
Edwin R. Keedy, History of the Pennsylvania Statute Creating Degrees of
Murder 97 U. PA. L. REV. 759, 771-72 (1949).
28
See, e.g. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 503-04, 508-11
(2001) JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 1-2 (5th
ed. 2009); CYNTHIA LEE & ANGELA HARRIS, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS (2005); MARKUS D. DUBBER & MARK G. KELMAN, AMERICAN
CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, STATUTES, COMMENTS (2005); PAUL H. ROBINSON,
CRIMINAL LAW: CASE STUDIES AND CONTROVERSIES (2005); JOHN KAPLAN,
ROBERT WEISBERG, GUYORA BINDER, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
(5th ed. 2004); RICHARD J. BONNIE, ANNE M. COUGHLIN, JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR.
& PETER W. LOW, CRIMINAL LAW (2nd ed. 2004); LLOYD L WEINREB, CRIMINAL
LAW: CASES, COMMENTS, QUESTIONS (7th ed. 2003); GEORGE E. DIX AND M.
MICHAEL SHARLOT, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (5th ed., 2002);
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killing of a human being with malice aforethought is murder,” a
nod to English common law, but then goes on to distinguish first
degree murder by including instances where a killing is committed
“against any law enforcement officer in the performance of his or
her duty or committed against an assistant attorney general or
special assistant attorney general in the performance of his or her
duty.”29 This last provision, protecting prosecutors and police, is
neither a product of the Pennsylvania model nor the English
common law, but is a unique consequence of the legislative and
political history of Rhode Island.
Nevada is similar.
Even while clinging to malice
aforethought for murder generally, Nevada distinguishes first
degree murder by limiting it to cases where the killing is
“[c]ommitted in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of
sexual assault, kidnapping, arson, robbery, burglary, invasion of
the home, sexual abuse of a child, sexual molestation of a child
under the age of 14 years, child abuse or abuse of an older person
or vulnerable person.”30 While many of the above fall under the
doctrine of felony murder, this does not necessarily mean that they
therefore derive from the common law of England. Indeed,
criminal law scholar Guyora Binder has shown that felony murder
does not in fact derive from England at all, meaning that it is just
as much an American doctrine as a British one.31 Further,
Nevada’s additional provisions for first degree murder are also
American. For example, first degree murder includes killings that
take place “on the property of a public or private school, at an
activity sponsored by a public or private school or on a school bus
while the bus was engaged in its official duties” are not English
either.32 Such attendant circumstances are not products of English
common law, forged in an era long before children rode buses to
school – but unique circumstances in Nevada.
Similarly unique circumstances rear their heads in other
states as well. In Massachusetts, for example, any killing done
with “deliberately premeditated malice aforethought” – an odd
combination of the Pennsylvania and common law definitions – is
first degree murder, as well as any killing committed “with
extreme atrocity or cruelty.”33 In Oklahoma, first degree murder
includes any killing done with malice aforethought as well as any
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, MODERN CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, COMMENTS AND
QUESTIONS (3rd ed. 2001).
29
R. I. GEN. LAWS § 11-23-1 (2009).
30
NEV. REV. STAT. §200.030 (2009).
31
Guyora Binder, The Origins of the American Felony Murder Rule, 57
STANFORD L. REV. 59 (2004) (recovering the American origins of the felony
murder rule).
32
NEV. REV. STAT. §200.030
33
MASS. GEN. LAWS. Ch. 265 § 1 (2009).
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killing done in conjunction with child abuse, a particularly
despicable crime for which a different mens rea term is used: “the
willful or malicious injuring, torturing, maiming or using of
unreasonable force” on a child.34
California also distinguishes between first and second
degree murder by attendant circumstances, including whether
killing was done “by means of discharging a firearm from a motor
vehicle, intentionally at another person outside of the vehicle with
the intent to inflict death.”35 This statute was enacted in 1993 after
a string of drive-by shootings in Los Angeles during the late 1980s
and early 1990s.36 Republican Governor Pete Wilson supported
the law, and even gang-members themselves attempted to stop the
practice.37 Only a few months after the statute’s enactment, for
example, two hundred members of Los Angeles area “warring
gangs” called for a stop to drive-by shootings, some threatening
shooters with retribution in prison.38 The Mexican Mafia, known
simply as “La EME” or “the letter M,” “ordered thousands of
Latino gang members to halt drive-by shootings" in the Los
Angeles area.39
Though California’s drive-by statute reflects a particular
aspect of local culture in Los Angeles, criminal law casebooks
continue to portray California as a common law state, implying
that it somehow continues to adhere to English common law. On
the contrary, however, California’s clear allusion to gang-related
violence represents the kind of unique circumstance that
distinguishes American from English law. To tell students that
murder in each of these states is based simply on ancient English
notions of malice aforethought is wrong.
Despite malice aforethought’s continued presence in
American casebooks, most so-called common law states do not
employ the term at all, making its pedagogical relevance even
more questionable. To take just a few examples, Idaho, also
presumably a common law state, incorporated the Pennsylvania
model but, unlike California, rejected the term malice
34

OKLA. STAT. §21-701.7 (2009).
CAL. PEN. CODE §189 (2009).
36
3 Killed, 6 Injured in 2 Drive-By Shootings, L.A. TIMES, April 8, 1993; DriveBy Shootings Raise Police Alarm, L.A. TIMES, July 23, 1990; Drive-By
Shootings in 2 Cities Leave 3 Men Wounded, L.A. TIMES, June 11, 1989;
Woman Killed and 6 Injured in Drive-By Shootings, L.A. TIMES, July 11, 1988;
Drive-by Shootings Wound 4, Including 2 Young Children, L.A. TIMES, May 26,
1988.
37
Issue: Drive-By Shootings, LOS ANGELES TIMES, Aug. 22, 1993; Santa Ana
Gang Members Step Outside Turf, Call for Peace, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1993.
38
Santa Ana Gang Members Step Outside Turf, Call for Peace, L.A. TIMES, Oct.
2, 1993.
39
Santa Ana Gang Members Step Outside Turf, Call for Peace, L.A. TIMES, Oct.
2, 1993.
35
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aforethought, adding instead a series of its own mens rea
components, including murder done with the “intent” to “execute
vengeance,” “extort something from the victim,” or “satisfy some
sadistic inclination,” none of which appeared in the English
common law.40 Vermont, another common law state, also rejected
malice aforethought, but included none of the additional mens rea
requirements that emerged in California or Idaho, simply relying
on “willful, premeditated, and deliberate killing.”41 Mississippi
drafted first degree murder to include killing “done with deliberate
design,” a unique rendition of the Pennsylvania model.42 In
Vermont and Michigan, murder must be committed “by wilful,
deliberate and premeditated killing, again direct takes on the
Pennsylvania model.43
While the tired pedagogical technique of using malice
aforethought as a foil for the MPC only applies to six states – and
therefore should be brought to an end – defenders of the common
law fiction will invariably mention South Carolina, the only state
that does not divide murder into degrees, as a living, if lonely,
embodiment of England’s legacy. Yet, even South Carolina
includes within its definition of murder uniquely American
language, including “[k]illing by stabbing or thrusting,” a capital
crime applicable to instances where the victim “has not then any
weapon drawn” or “has not then first stricken” the defendant.44 Of
course, there is a statutory exception for anyone who happens to
cause death while “chastising or correcting his child,” rendering
the stabbing manslaughter.45
Is murder the only area where so-called “common law
states” depart significantly from the ancient English common law?
No. While most criminal law casebooks recognize the
Pennsylvania innovation when it comes to murder, they fail to
discuss similar grading schemes, all uniquely American, that apply
to other offenses.46 For example, American states developed
grading schemes for most violent felonies, not just murder, in the
nineteenth century. By 1857, for example, the New York
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legislature had graded the offenses of burglary, arson, and robbery,
substantially transforming the common law definitions of each.47
Interestingly, Pennsylvania did not grade its violent nonhomicide felonies until after New York, while New York did not
grade murder until 1860, over half a century after Pennsylvania.48
Therefore, to say that New York followed the Pennsylvania model
would not be entirely correct, since it graded its violent felonies
prior to the Quaker state. In fact, as regards felonies other than
murder, it would probably be more correct to say that Pennsylvania
followed New York, for by the time that New York had graded its
felonies, Pennsylvania still only graded murder.49 Just as there was
a Pennsylvania model for murder, in other words, so too was there
arguably a separate, New York model for burglary, arson, and
robbery, one that so-called common law states have all tended to
follow.
Other crimes also reflect the failure of so-called common
law states to follow English common law, statutory rape perhaps
foremost among them.50 Inspired by a 1576 statute enacted in
Elizabethan England, for example, North Carolina established the
age of consent for statutory rape at 10 in 1869.51 By 1917,
however, North Carolina raised this age to 12, increasing it again
to 16 in 1923.52 Rather than a faithful representation of ancient
English common law, in other words, the Tarheel State’s age of
consent reflected insecurities about teenage behavior immediately
after World War I, the height of the jazz age.53
Even states that did not adopt the MPC – what scholars call
common law states – participated in the process of codification and
transformation.54 Massachusetts provides an example. By 1857,
47
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Massachusetts had codified the crime of kidnapping to include
“forcibly carrying” persons against their will “out of the state” and,
also, “secretly confining or imprisoning” any person “against
[their] will.”55 This latter portion, the act of confining, had not
been considered by English common law to have been kidnapping,
Why Massachusetts decided to
but false imprisonment.56
incorporate false imprisonment into its statute on kidnapping is not
clear, though the innovation caught on in other common law states
like Idaho, which includes in its statute anyone who “confines” a
victim “secretly,” even as it follows the non-common law practice
of grading.57
Perhaps because American kidnapping confuses the
English common law concept of false imprisonment, it is not
discussed at length in criminal law casebooks. Yet, even crimes
that are mentioned in criminal law casebooks have been altered in
common law states. To take another example, North Carolina, one
of the states commonly cited as a common law state, significantly
altered the English common law definition of rape by refusing to
require that victims forcibly resist their attackers. In cases where
victims suffered from “fear, fright, or coercion,” noted North
Carolina’s Supreme Court in 1946, a showing of actual force by
the defendant was not necessary.58
Keeping the above examples in mind, why do criminal law
professors, and criminal law casebooks, persist in the fiction of the
common law state?59 Part of the story lies in the politics of legal
pedagogy. Prior to 1940, criminal law casebooks consisted – as
their names suggest – almost entirely of cases. Renowned criminal
law teachers like Chicago Professor Joseph Henry Beale included
anywhere from six to nine cases per topic in their casebooks,
occluding any mention of law review articles, philosophical
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treatises, or sociological studies.60 This meant that before a student
covered a subject, say provocation or self-defense, she – or more
likely he – walked through at least six factual scenarios, and six
legal conclusions, from which said student could then synthesize a
formal legal rule.61
Beginning in the 1930s, a young Columbia law professor
named Herbert Wechsler began to change this.62 Convinced that
Beale’s case method tended to produce overly conservative,
narrow-minded attorneys, Wechsler worked with a colleague,
Jerome Michael, to produce a new kind of criminal law casebook,
one that dramatically reduced the number of cases students had to
read, substituting in their place bits of law review articles,
paragraphs from major philosophical treatises, and statistical
studies.63
To Wechsler’s mind, substituting outside materials for
cases promised to change the way that students thought about law.
Rather than learning to revere legal opinions, students would,
Wechsler hoped, come to criticize them.64 Regularly, Wechsler
included notes that prompted students to question the normative
basis of judicial opinions, at times even mocking judicial deference
to precedent and English common law.65 Though such an
iconoclastic approach risked leaving students confused and
arguably even unprepared for the criminal bar, Wechsler did not
particularly care whether his students entered criminal practice or
not. In fact, the administration at Columbia joined him in
discouraging students from becoming criminal lawyers, partly
because the field tended to be low-paying, but also because
defense attorneys tended to be associated with the criminal element
and prosecutors tended to become politically compromised.66
Enter the modern criminal law casebook. Seizing an
opportunity to nudge criminal law away from practitioners and
towards future “legislators” Wechsler published his book in 1940
to widespread acclaim, dramatically – perhaps even tragically –

60

JOSEPH HENRY BEALE, JR. A SELECTION OF CASES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES
UPON CRIMINAL LAW (1894).
61
JOSEPH HENRY BEALE, JR. A SELECTION OF CASES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES
UPON CRIMINAL LAW (1894).
62

Anders Walker, The Anti-Case Method: Herbert Wechsler and the Political
History of the Criminal Law Course, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 217 (2009).
63
Anders Walker, The Anti-Case Method: Herbert Wechsler and the Political
History of the Criminal Law Course, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 217 (2009).
64
Anders Walker, The Anti-Case Method: Herbert Wechsler and the Political
History of the Criminal Law Course, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 217 (2009).
65
Anders Walker, The Anti-Case Method: Herbert Wechsler and the Political
History of the Criminal Law Course, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 217 (2009).
66
Anders Walker, The Anti-Case Method: Herbert Wechsler and the Political
History of the Criminal Law Course, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 217 (2009).

14

influencing an entire generation of law students.67 Foremost
among such students was a young Navy veteran named Sanford
Kadish who took Wechsler’s criminal law course in 1946 and,
inspired by Wechsler’s law and society approach, then went on to
produce his own, iconic, Wechsler-inspired text in 1962.68
Why are Kadish and Wechsler relevant to understanding
the division between “common law” and “Model Penal Code”
states? From 1952 to 1962 Herbert Wechsler served as the
Reporter for the American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code
project, overseeing the creation of the code, a production that
younger scholars like Kadish reverently emphasized in their
casebooks.69 Completed in 1962, the MPC introduced a series of
revisions to criminal law definitions that, presumably, had
themselves come directly from the ancient common law of
England.
In fact, the Model Penal Code’s Commentaries
repeatedly referenced the “Common-Law Background” of
American criminal law, using it as a foil for the innovations
introduced by the MPC.70 To anyone unfamiliar with the statutory
nuance of American criminal codes, the MPC Commentaries
themselves made it logical to distinguish between MPC states and
common law states, a divide that scholars like Kadish imported
into their casebooks. Though much of that law was itself codified,
Kadish chose to refer to states that either did not adopt the Model
Penal Code, or had yet to adopt it as “common law” – not code
states.71

II. THE MYTH OF THE MODEL PENAL CODE STATE
While thirty-four states adopted portions of the Model
Penal Code, no state adopted all of it.72 Even states that adopted
much of it – New York, Illinois, and Missouri all examples –
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tended to amend MPC definitions with new legislation.73 Why? A
brief look at the archaeology of state codes indicates that those
portions of the MPC which challenged local, cultural values tended
to fail, while those sections that simply reiterated what many
people already felt, tended to succeed, rendering so-called “MPC”
states hybrid regimes that enjoyed some of the modern
innovations provided by the MPC, yet retained distinctive aspects
of older, more local law.74
To illustrate, one of the MPC’s most-heralded reforms was
a recommendation that inchoate offenses, conspiracy, attempt, and
so on, be punished just as harshly as completed offenses, a rule that
coincided nicely with the instrumentalist view that individuals who
attempted to commit crimes were just as dangerous as individuals
who completed crimes.75 Yet, no state adopted the rule, indicating
that voters were simply not willing to jettison traditional notions
that individuals who completed crimes were more guilty than those
who did not.76 Similarly, no states adopted the MPC’s elimination
of the overt act requirement in conspiracies chargeable as first or
second degree offenses.77 Traditionally, conspiracy required an
agreement to commit a crime and an overt act in furtherance of that
crime.78 However, in an attempt to ramp up controls for future
73
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dangerousness, the MPC eliminated the overt act requirement for
serious crimes, transforming the offense into an Orwellian exercise
in thought control.79 While some scholars praised this ultraaggressive approach, all thirty-four states that adopted portions of
the MPC balked.80 Even New York and Illinois, both of whom
suffered longstanding problems with organized crime, rejected the
MPC approach and held that an overt act need be proven for every
grade of conspiracy, even the most serious.81
How can such digressions be rationalized? One likely
explanation is that state legislators felt the MPC’s innovations
outstripped popular notions of how certain crimes should be
punished. In the case of inchoate crimes like conspiracy and
attempt, for example, the MPC may simply have appeared too
harsh. Though the MPC’s position was logically consistent with an
emphasis on controlling dangerousness, its elevation of mental
state above conduct appeared too much for legislators to accept,
even for conspiracies that involved organized crime.
Conversely, when crimes involved children, the public
seemed more eager for punishment than the MPC. In a remarkable
continuation of its emphasis on mental state, for example, the
Model Penal Code allowed adults guilty of sleeping with minors to
escape strict liability unless the child was ten years old or
younger.82 Unwilling to provide sex offenders such relief, all 34
MPC states rejected the Code’s statutory rape provision.83 As we
79
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have seen, this very age had been contemplated by English law
during the reign of Queen Elizabeth, and rejected by American
common law states like North Carolina.84 Instead, states set the
age of victims at 13 in some jurisdictions, and as high as 17 in
others.85 For example, Missouri declared statutory rape chargeable
to individuals who had intercourse with minors under fourteen
years of age.86 Yet, a fourteen year old could, with the permission
of a judge, enter into marriage and obviate the rule.87 This
“marriage rape exemption” represented a direct reflection not of
MPC treatmentism, but “a relic of the past,” a type of shotgun
wedding provision that presumed “girls are sure to be better off
with a husband to look after them rather than be subject to a life on
welfare.”88 In fact, Missouri’s treatment of sexual offenses like
statutory rape reflects precisely the kind of local, cultural
specificity that students assigned either the MPC or English
common law miss.
What larger lessons can be learned from looking at state
rejections of MPC provisions on statutory rape, attempt, and
conspiracy? Simply because states adopted portions of the Model
Penal Code did not mean that they adopted all of the Code, or even
its most distinctive sections. Further, denoting certain states MPC
states only obfuscates the fact that even those states most open to
the MPC remained, in the final analysis, hybrids. Either they
blended the MPC with older state codes, conflated state statutes
with ancient English common law rules, or carved out their own,
culturally distinct paths.
Another area where the MPC failed to convince state
legislatures was murder. Frustrated at state tendencies to reduce
premeditation to an instant, the MPC’s drafters collapsed first and
second degree murder into a single offense, triggered whenever a
defendant “causes the death of another human being” purposely,
knowingly, or “recklessly under circumstances manifesting
extreme indifference to the value of human life.”89 While the
drafters retained some exceptions for the death penalty – all 34
states that adopted portions of the MPC rejected the Code’s
older, those individuals could be found guilty of a new crime: “Corruption of
Minors,” which constituted a third-degree felony, two grades lower than
statutory rape, a felony of the first degree. MODEL PENAL CODE §213.3
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84
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recommendations, choosing instead to preserve the distinction
between first and second degree.
Often, the decision to preserve and/or expand first degree
murder reflected local politics. New York provides an example.
Out of all the states in the union that adopted portions of the Model
Penal Code, New York should arguably have been the most proMPC, if for no other reason than that New York Governor Nelson
Rockefeller assigned Herbert Wechsler, the American Law
Institute’s Reporter for the MPC, to serve on its Temporary
Commission to Revise New York’s Penal Law.90 Though a
supporter of the Model Penal Code, particularly reduction of
murder to one degree, Wechsler remained acutely aware of the
political pressures that voters exerted in New York, and
subsequently tailored the code to local conditions.91
To illustrate, by 1961, New York was the last state in the
Union to impose a mandatory death penalty for all cases of first
degree murder. While Wechsler opposed the death penalty as a
matter of principle, he insisted that any move to alter first degree
murder in New York required holding “public hearings” in order to
build popular support for legal change.92 Wechsler’s interest in
holding hearings reflected a democratic strain that ran through
much of New York’s adoption of the Model Penal Code. For
example, at a Commission meeting on December 8, 1961,
Wechsler warned that the “controversial” issue of the death penalty
presented the Commission with a unique “problem” in that public
attention to it far outweighed public interest in other aspects of the
criminal law, notions of culpability, justification, and excuse for
example.93 To avoid jeopardizing important reforms of the entire
code, in other words, Wechsler advocated catering to popular
opinion on the question of the death penalty “so as not to impede
the progress of a lot of other work that will not be controversial.”94
“My own view,” continued Wechsler, “is that a careful effort
should be made to separate these issues to which the public and the
legislature are to be really divided.”95
One issue that Wechsler feared might divide the public was
the death penalty. To avoid a political backlash on the penalty, he
recommended that the Commission “educate the legislature and the
90
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public,” particularly on issues of sentencing.96 He also lobbied in
favor of retaining the death penalty, but only in two limited
circumstances: 1) where a defendant killed a police officer “acting
in the line of duty,” and 2) where the defendant murdered a prison
guard.97
For the most part, such attention to moderate reform and
popular reception worked, engendering little political resistance.
“From both sides of the aisle today,” reported the New York Times
on June 4, 1965, “were applause and lavish praise for the
commission chairman, Republican Assemblyman Richard J.
Bartlett.”98 Precisely because the Committee had been careful not
to offend the public, even granting concessions to avoid backlash,
it had been able to achieve substantive reform.
Yet, the vagaries of popular opinion remained. Despite
Wechsler’s careful attention to popular caprice, the Commission’s
attempt to restrict the death penalty failed to withstand popular
anger at criminals, particularly as crime rates began rising in the
late 1960s. In October 1968, for example, a legislative committee
met in New York to decide whether to expand the scope of capital
punishment.99 Senator Edward J. Speno, the committee chair,
announced that “many legislators” in New York had received
“heavy mail” urging an expansion of cases where the penalty
applied.100 Much of this mail had been triggered by rising
crime.101 When New York City Controller Mario Procaccino
called for a “get tough” policy on crime during a public hearing in
Manhattan, including reinstatement of the electric chair for
murderers, audience members cheered.102 Conversely, “groans and
cat-calls” inundated psychiatrist Henry Peckstein when he warned
that “too much repressive legislation” could lead to a “fascist
state.”103
In 1971, state legislators extended capital punishment to
anyone who killed a corrections officer “while he is performing his
official duties.”104 In 1973, New York City mayoral candidate
Mario Biaggi called for the execution of “hired assassins,” “those
responsible for the killing of a witness to a serious crime,” and
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those who committed murder during a “rape, robbery, or
kidnapping.”105 In 1977, such a law passed both the House and
Senate, only to be vetoed by New York Governor Hugh Carey.106
Four years, and four vetoes later, the issue remained electric, this
time with New York Mayor and gubernatorial candidate Ed Koch
declaring that whether the death penalty deterred or not, it “is vital
that society be allowed to express its moral outrage at wanton
killing.”107 In 1984, the New York Court of Appeals entered the
fray and overturned the state’s statute requiring capital punishment
for offenders who killed while incarcerated, arguing that the
mandatory death penalty was unconstitutional.108
Despite the court’s ruling, popular initiatives to expand the
death penalty continued into the 1980s. In 1989, a democratic led
assembly voted to restore the penalty in cases of murder-for-hire,
murder of police officers, murder of witnesses, or murder in the
course of a violent crime.109 Governor Cuomo vetoed the law,
declaring that even though life had become “ugly and violent” in
New York, capital punishment constituted little more than an “act
of vengeance.”110 Frustration with Cuomo’s anti-death penalty
stance contributed to the 1994 election of George Elmer Pataki, the
first Republican Governor in twenty years.111 Pataki campaigned
on a promise to expand the death penalty, something that no New
York governor had done since 1977.112 On March 7, 1995, he
finally succeeded in reinstating the electric chair – three decades
after the Temporary Commission had tried to eliminate it – with a
new law creating ten separate instances where death was
appropriate. 113
Just as the political battle seemed over, the courts
intervened. In 2004, New York’s highest court invalidated
Pataki’s law on the grounds that it unconstitutionally pressured
jurors into choosing the death penalty by warning them that
offenders who did not get executed might be paroled.114 Though
Pataki moved quickly to amend the statute, he met stiff resistance
in the State Assembly, now controlled by Democrats who were
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softening on the issue.115
According to Democratic
Assemblywoman Helene E. Weinstein, initially a supporter of
capital punishment, “[m]y vote 10 years ago was 10 years ago.”116
Since then, argued Weinstein, “new information, important
information, about DNA testing” and “about innocent people being
convicted” had emerged, changing her mind.117 Though she did
not mention the program by name, Weinstein’s allusion to DNA
testing referred to the Innocence Project, a program founded by
law professors Barry Scheck and Peter Neufeld to show that a
surprising number of death row inmates were innocent of their
crimes.118
As the above section indicates, battles over the death
penalty in New York provide a glimpse into just how closely
popular politics, statutory law, and judicial opinions operate to
influence criminal law reform. Though support for the Model
Penal Code remained high in the state, popular politics won out,
influencing the state’s treatment of first degree murder.
Recovering some of the political wrangling that went into the
reform of these offenses helps complicate the notion of the Model
Penal Code state, showing how the Code was itself altered by local
norms and legislative decree.
Another area of the Model Penal Code roundly rejected by
states, but also related to homicide, was the elimination of felony
murder. The Model Penal Code rejected the concept of felony
murder, replacing it with homicide “committed recklessly under
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of
human life,” a condition that was “presumed” if the actor was
engaged in robbery, rape, arson, burglary, or kidnapping.119 Most
states refused to follow the MPC on this point, preserving the
separate crime of felony murder.120
Some states even went so far as to preserve felony murder
in cases where a non-violent felony was at issue.121 This was the
case in Missouri – an MPC state – where literally “any felony”
might trigger the state’s felony murder provision. In 1926, a court
found the illegal manufacture of whiskey to be a sufficient
predicate for felony murder, and in 1975 the Supreme Court of

115

Death Penalty Seems Unlikely to be Revived, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2005, at 1.
Id.
117
Id.
118
BARRY SCHECK & JIM DWYER, ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO
EXECUTION, AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED (2000).
119
MODEL PENAL CODE, §210.2
120
See, e.g. GENE SCHULTZ, CRIMINAL OFFENSES AND DEFENSES IN MISSOURI
166 (1986).
121
State v. Robinett, 279 S.W. 696 (1926); Missouri v. Chambers, 524 S.W.2d
826 (1975).
116

22

Missouri found stealing to be a sufficient predicate felony.122
Also, Missouri considers felonies that actually cause the death of
victims – and are therefore barred from being predicate felonies in
other states due to what is known as the “merger doctrine” –
legitimate triggers for felony murder.123 An example occurred in
2001, when a defendant was successfully charged with felony
murder for unlawfully using a firearm against a victim, the
unlawful use of a firearm qualifying as the underlying felony.124
The State Court of Appeals literally “abrogated” the merger
doctrine, holding that in cases where defendants’ “assaultive acts”
resulted in death, those assaultive acts could themselves be
considered predicate felonies.125 Even though this led to an
arguably “absurd result” namely the possibility that someone could
be convicted of “both murder and the assault giving rise to the
murder, as a separate felony” Missouri courts held fast to their new
common law rule.126
Almost as unpopular as the MPC’s elimination of felony
murder was its modification of the necessity defense.127 At
common law, necessity could be invoked in rare cases where a
defendant committed a crime to prevent the occurrence of a greater
harm that the defendant did not herself cause.128 The MPC
expanded this defense, allowing defendants to take it even if they
had inadvertently caused the greater harm.129 The MPC also
allowed the defense to apply to a broad, relatively undefined
number of “harm[s] or evil[s],” opening the door to myriad
scenarios that most courts and legislatures would ultimately reject,
including for example allowing for the theft of food in cases where
a defendant’s children were hungry.130 Partly for these reasons,
only two of the total 34 MPC states adopted its version.131
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Sometimes states adopted the MPC but changed it, adding
provisions that ultimately undermined its strength.132 This was the
case in Illinois, where the state legislature gradually added mental
states to the MPC’s purpose, knowledge, recklessness, negligence
formula. By 2007, it had added “having reason to know,”
“reasonably
should
know,”
“willfully,”
“maliciously,”
133
“fraudulently,” and “designedly.”
Though trivial, such
modifications ultimately reflected a much larger trend, namely a
tendency on the part of state legislatures across the country to alter
key provisions of the MPC once it had been adopted. As we have
seen, this emerged in the context not simply of mental states, but
inchoate offenses, accomplice liability, statutory rape, felony
murder, first degree murder, and necessity. In the next section, we
will see how even those aspects of the MPC faithfully preserved by
state legislators became manipulated by courts.

III. The New Common Law
While legislative modifications to the MPC are wellknown, less studied are efforts that courts have made to alter MPC
definitions. Yet, most states that adopted portions of the MPC
have almost half a century of case law interpreting model penal
code provisions. This new common law remains one of the least
studied aspects of criminal law today, even though it impacts both
the general and special parts of most state criminal codes.
For example, one of the Model Penal Code’s greatest
contributions to criminal law is often considered to be the
culpability provisions enumerated in its general part.134 Prior to
the drafting of the Code, states employed a variety of poorly
defined terms to denote mental state, including malice, mens rea,
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willfulness, scienter and “general intent.”135 To clarify what,
precisely, such terms meant, the MPC divided mental state into
four presumably straightforward categories: purpose, knowledge,
recklessness, and negligence.136 Whether a defendant possesses
one particular mental state over another could have significant
consequences. For example, if a defendant “unlawfully confines”
a victim with the purpose of facilitating the commission of a
felony, then that defendant could be charged with kidnapping, a
“felony of the first degree,” while if they simply restrain someone
the appropriate charge would be false imprisonment, a
misdemeanor.137
Yet, as precise as the MPC’s delineations of mens rea are,
state courts across the country have done much to muddy them,
allowing jurors to impose culpability on defendants regardless of
their actual thoughts. The primary vehicle for this has been a
common law rule that a defendant’s mental state can be imputed
through “the natural and probable consequences” of her actions.138
While MPC architect Herbert Wechsler recognized that such a
doctrine may be “the only way of proving intent” in some cases, he
bridled at judicial overuse of the theory, particularly in cases where
jurors were given a choice of possible mental states.139 “Since a
particular crime must actually be intended,” warned Wechsler, “the
charge must be precise and must not permit the jury to convict the
actor on one of several mental states.”140 Yet, this is precisely
what courts across the country have done; reducing the Model
Penal Code’s narrow tailoring of mental states to a loose menu of
options that jurors can pick and choose from to get a conviction.141
New York provides an example. After an “all-night St.
Patrick’s Day Celebration” on Long Island in 1987, a former New
York City Police officer shot and killed one of his colleagues.142
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Though the officer could not explain or even remember why he
killed his victim, he was charged with intentional murder (second
degree in New York), depraved heart murder (requiring the lower
mental state of extreme recklessness), and, at the judge’s request,
manslaughter in the first degree as a lesser included offense of
intentional murder and manslaughter in the second degree as a
lesser included offense of depraved heart murder.143 Just as
Wechsler warned, jurors found themselves suddenly able to choose
from a smorgasbord of mental states, undermining the Model Penal
Code’s imperative that a defendant’s state of mind be matched
with a single crime.144
Accomplice liability marks another area where courts have
tended to veer away from the MPC’s culpability provisions. While
the MPC made it clear that an accomplice needed the mental state
of purpose, thereby rejecting the natural and probable
consequences rule, courts in several states have gone the other
way, allowing mental states to be imputed based on the natural and
probable consequences of the accomplice’s actions.145 Even states
that initially came out against applying the natural and probable
consequences doctrine to accomplices have since developed new,
judicially-created parallel theories that accomplish the same end.146
For example, just as Missouri courts declared that they would not
impute mental state based on the natural and probable
consequences of an accomplice’s actions, so did new courts hold
that a defendant is responsible for “those crimes which he could
reasonably anticipate would be a part of that conduct.”147
Other common law rules survived in so-called MPC states
as well, dramatically altering many of the MPC’s provisions.
Again, murder in New York provides an example. At common
law, defendants who intentionally killed their victims could assert
a partial defense if they suffered from a “heat of blood or passion”
or were “greatly provoked.”148 Classic common law examples of
such provocation included mutual combat brought on by a “sudden
quarrel,” catching “another in the act of adultery with [one’s]
143
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wife,” and retaliation for having one’s “nose pulled.”149 The
defense could be claimed so long as the defendant did not have
“sufficient cooling time for passion to subside and reason to
interpose.”150
To distinguish itself from the common law, the MPC
rejected the language of sudden passion, opting instead for
“extreme mental or emotional disturbance.”151 Pursuant to this
language, the Code did not require “that the actor’s emotional
distress” come from “some injury, affront, or other provocative act
perpetrated upon him by the deceased.”152 Instead, it did away
with “a host of more or less hard and fast common law rules
defining the scope of the provocation defense.”153 As it did away
with such rules, however, the MPC also failed to provide clear
guidance on what, precisely, constituted extreme emotional
disturbance. This left a considerable amount of interpretation, if
not outright law-creation, up to New York courts.
In 1976, the New York Court of Appeals decided an early
case, New York v. Patterson, involving the extreme emotional
disturbance offense, noting that “[t]he opportunity opened for
mitigation differs significantly from the traditional heat of passion
defense.”154 Citing the Model Penal Code Commentaries, the
court asserted that the new emotional disturbance language did not
limit the defense to instances where “a defendant, provoked, acts
‘under the influence of some sudden and uncontrollable
emotion.’”155
To elaborate, the court abandoned the old
requirement that no cooling time could pass between the
provocation and the act, holding instead that precisely because “a
significant mental trauma” might have influenced the defendant’s
thought processes “for a substantial period of time,” any length of
time could pass and the defendant could still claim the defense.156
Precisely because New York’s Penal Code made no
mention of cooling time, Patterson quickly became legal doctrine
in the Empire State. Four years later, for example, the New York
Court of Appeals again dealt with an emotional disturbance case,
citing Patterson as evidence of the “distinction between the past
and present law of mitigation.”157 “In Patterson,” asserted the
149
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court in People v. Casassa, an act arising from extreme emotional
disturbance did not have to be “spontaneously undertaken.”158 On
the contrary, “it may be that a significant mental trauma has
affected a defendant’s mind for a substantial period of time,
simmering in the unknowing subconscious and then inexplicably
coming to the fore.”159
Even as Casassa cited Patterson for the new common law
rule that cooling time did not apply, so too did Casassa develop a
rule of its own, namely that the emotional disturbance in question
had to have an objectively reasonable explanation. This holding
settled an ambiguity in the statutory language of the MPC which
provided a mitigating defense so long as the “defendant acted
under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which
there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the reasonableness
of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the
defendant’s situation under the circumstances as the defendant
believed them to be.”160 Though the statute’s call to focus on
circumstances “as the defendant believed them to be” could be
read as a subjective standard, the court found an equally plausible,
objective reading. “Whether the language of this statute requires a
completely subjective evaluation of reasonableness,” mused Judge
Jasen, “is a question that has never been decided by this court.”161
Conceding that the MPC hoped to do away with “the rigid rules
that have developed with respect to the sufficiency of particular
types of provocation, such as the rule that words alone can never
be enough,” the court held firm to the view that “[t]he ultimate test,
however, is objective.”162
Over the course of the next two decades, the New York
Court of Appeals assembled a collection of cases illustrating
precisely how and when the defense of extreme emotional
disturbance might apply – all arguably necessary reading for
students interested in comprehending the doctrine. To take just a
few examples, the court held that an instruction was not warranted
in a case where a victim put his hand on a defendant’s plate of
food, but was warranted when a victim mocked a defendant’s
inability to get an erection, overturning the traditional rule that
words alone could not constitute provocation.163 Indeed, judicial
interpretations of what did and did not constitute sufficient
provocation provided something of a triptych into community
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norms in New York, distinguishing actions that impugned cultural
artifices like masculinity from mere annoyances.
Though criminal law casebooks often cite classic common
law examples of provocation – mutual combat, catching spouses in
bed with others, and so on – none discuss the manner in which
courts have created new categories of voluntary manslaughter that
coincide with the MPC. Nor, for that matter, do casebooks explain
how courts in MPC states have actually resurrected older
categories that undermine the Code.164 For example, even though
the Arkansas legislature adopted the MPC’s “extreme emotional
disturbance” language, Arkansas courts quickly took the doctrine
in a very different direction from the Empire State, returning it to
Rather than follow New York’s
its pre-MPC guise.165
abandonment of old, common law terms like provocation,
Arkansas judges re-inserted provocation into its new defense.166
“We have held repeatedly,” noted the Arkansas Supreme Court in
2005, “that in order for a jury to be instructed on extremeemotional disturbance manslaughter, there must be evidence that
the defendant killed the victim in the moment following some kind
of provocation, such as ‘physical fighting, a threat, or brandishing
a weapon.’”167
Further, Arkansas adopted the long-standing rule that the
killing had to occur before a significant cooling time could pass, a
point rejected by the MPC.168 Even though Arkansas continued to
use the term “extreme emotional disturbance,” in other words, state
courts had effectively resurrected the old common law provocation
defense. This, ironically, was the new common law rediscovering
old forms.
Other examples of judicial law creation emerged in
Pennsylvania. After joining the Model Penal Code in eliminating
the language of consent from its rape statute, for example,
Pennsylvania reduced rape to instances where defendants engaged
in sexual intercourse “by forcible compulsion.”169 State courts then
proceeded to enumerate a variety of circumstances not anticipated
by the MPC in which forcible compulsion might apply.170 To take
just a few examples, Pennsylvania courts found forcible
164
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compulsion when a defendant who enjoyed his victim’s trust and
confidence employed “emotional exploitation” and when a father
employed “psychological coercion” by engaging in sexual
intercourse with his daughter after showing her sexually explicit
photographs.171 Neither case involved either the use or threat of
force, indicating that courts were pushing the law of rape in new
directions, away from MPC and common law rules rooted in
resistance, and towards standards more sensitive to disparate
power relations. Along these lines, Pennsylvania courts also found
forcible compulsion when a therapist abused his authority over a
patient and an employer abused his authority over an employee.172
Even as Pennsylvania courts exploded the force rule, other
states developed judicial innovations in the law of rape as well,
including a doctrine that obviated the force requirement in cases
where accomplices were involved.173 This rule manifest itself
most clearly in Missouri, where a court encountered a case
involving two men, A & B, who burglarized a house.174 While A
(the defendant) searched a portion of the house, B discovered a
female and warned her not to make any trouble on pain of instant
death.175 B then left the victim alone in a room and went to tell A
of her presence, at which point A went to the room where the
victim was and had sexual intercourse with her – without using
either force or threats.176 Though A did not employ forcible
compulsion, a Missouri appellate court held that he could be
convicted nevertheless because he had, ultimately, been
responsible for B terrifying the victim.177
Just as Missouri and Pennsylvania courts altered the MPC’s
law of rape, so too did other states alter the MPC’s approach to
accomplice liability. Across the river from Missouri, for example,
Illinois courts retained the merger doctrine but revised the MPC’s
accomplice liability language. While the MPC made it clear that
the natural and probable consequences of one party’s actions could
not be used to implicate others, Illinois courts found an alternate
rule that achieved a similar end. Rather than natural and probable
consequences, Illinois judges turned to a judicially constructed
doctrine known as the “common design rule” that held “where two
or more persons engage in a common criminal design,” then “any
acts in furtherance thereof committed by one party are considered
171
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to be the acts of all parties to the common design.”178 Though
reminiscent of the MPC’s conspiracy language, the doctrine
actually lent itself to a dramatic reformulation of accomplice
liability, particularly since “the State need only prove the accused
had the specific intent to promote or facilitate a crime.”179 For
example, in a case styled People v. Reid, the defendant agreed to
participate in a robbery only to discover that one of his
accomplices secretly intended to shoot the victim.180 While under
the MPC the defendant would not have been held responsible for a
crime he did not anticipate, the Illinois appellate court held
explicitly that it was not “necessary” for the prosecution “to prove
the accused had the specific intent to promote or facilitate the
crime with which he is charged.”181 Instead, all the state had to
show was that the accomplices had agreed to commit “a crime,”
meaning any crime that might be framed as part of a common
plan.182
While Illinois adopted the common design rule, Maine
courts modified the MPC in another way, by resurrecting natural
and probable consequences as a way of establishing accomplice
liability. The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine sanctioned this
approach in State v. Linscott, a 1987 case involving the conviction
of an accomplice who claimed to lack the requisite mental state for
murder.183 According to the defendant, he joined three other men
in what he believed was going to be the robbery of a local cocaine
dealer, only to learn that one of his accomplices secretly planned to
murder the victim.184 Though the court believed defendant lacked
the requisite intent for murder, it nevertheless invoked the doctrine
of “foreseeable consequence[s],” holding that mental state could be
imputed based on the natural and probable consequences of
defendant’s actions, and a probable consequence of an armed
robbery was murder.185 While the MPC expressly rejected such an
approach, and Maine otherwise adopted much of the MPC, this
particular provision marked a departure from the code by state
courts.
Missouri courts performed a similar revision on the Model
Penal Code’s definition of conspiracy. While the Missouri
legislature adopted the MPC requirement that overt acts be
required to establish all but the most serious of conspiracies,
Missouri courts quickly loosened this requirement to include the
178
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absence of action. For example, in a 1984 case styled State v.
Mace, the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District held
that while “proof must be adduced that an overt act” occurred,
there was actually “no requirement” that such an act be “a physical
act.”186 Indeed, the court even went so far as to hold that “mere
silence” counted as an overt act, rendering the rule near
meaningless.187
Missouri courts performed a similar revision on the Model
Penal Code’s definition of knowledge. While the Model Penal
Code limited knowledge to instances where a defendant is
“practically certain” that his conduct will produce a certain result,
the appellate court for the Western District of Missouri expanded
this definition to include a defendant who shot his “best friend”
after pointing and firing what he believed to be an empty handgun
at him.188 Prior to the killing, defendant welcomed victim to his
home, “talked, joked, and laughed” with him, and then accepted
victim’s offer to inspect a handgun that victim had concealed under
his shirt.189 Defendant emptied several rounds from the gun’s
chamber and, believing the gun to be empty, pointed it in jest at his
friend and pulled the trigger three times, killing him on the third.190
Though defendant’s conduct indicated that he did not actually
know the gun was loaded, and therefore was negligent, the
Missouri court presumed that the defendant and the victim were
engaged in a game of “Chicken” and that the defendant therefore
knew he would kill his friend when he pulled the trigger.191
However, even if the defendant had been engaged in a game of
chicken, this does not necessarily mean that he knew he was going
to kill his friend. At best, he knew there was a substantial risk that
he might kill his friend, rendering his mental state one of
recklessness. After all, while the Model Penal Code provides for a
finding of knowledge where a defendant “is aware of a high
probability” that something exists, this expansion is obviated in
cases where a defendant “actually believes that it does not exist,”
as the defendant in Johnston likely did when firing a gun at his best
friend.192 Perhaps eager to deter citizens of Missouri from
engaging in similar games in the future, however, the appellate
court sanctioned a substantial departure from the MPC’s definition
of knowledge, allowing the jury to find knowledge in cases where
defendants at best were aware of a risk.193
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In a manner that only highlights the extent to which courts
employed “new” common law rules to transform the MPC,
Missouri courts took a very different – but arguably equally
heretical – tack in cases that involved defendants who implausibly
maintained that they were not aware of the age of certain minors
who joined them in criminal activity.194 For example, in State v.
Hopkins, a Missouri appellate court ignored the Model Penal
Code’s definition of knowledge and concluded that a defendant
who purchased alcohol for a twelve year old and proceeded to
drink alcohol with that twelve year old in his car was not guilty of
second degree child endangerment.195
Though the MPC’s
definition of knowledge – which the Missouri legislature adopted –
clearly allowed for a conviction in such a case where a defendant
was at the very least “aware of a high probability” that a certain
attendant circumstance was true, the Court of Appeals for the
Eastern District of Missouri held that the state had to prove that the
defendant “actually knew the victim was under 17.”196 In arriving
at this holding, the Eastern District relied on an earlier case that
also let a defendant go free for not checking the age of a minor.197
In that case, State v. Nations, the defendant hired a sixteen year old
to dance at a nightclub without checking her age.198 Though
convicted at the trial level for “knowingly” endangering the
welfare of a child “less than seventeen years old,” the appellate
court reversed, marking a dramatic departure from the Western
District’s holding in the Russian roulette case that the defendant
knew he had shot his best friend even though he had emptied
several rounds from the chamber. Obviously, both the shooter and
the endangerers knew there was some probability their conduct
might lead to a criminal result, yet the new common law treated
the two types of defendant differently. Why? Perhaps Missouri
courts wanted to send a stronger signal to those who toyed with
lethal weapons than those who drank alcohol with children. Or,
perhaps Missouri courts wanted to signal to parents that they, and
not the law, were ultimately responsible for supervising their
progeny. Regardless of the precise reason, Missouri’s new
common law dramatically complicated the Model Penal Code’s
otherwise straightforward definition of knowledge.
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Rather than an outlier, Missouri proved representative of
nearly all thirty-four states that adopted the MPC.199 In each of
these states, courts stepped in after the Code was adopted and
altered key provisions.200 Such alterations – or what this article
calls new common law – are largely ignored in the literature but, as
we shall see in the next section, theoretically significant.

IV. THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS
Criminal law scholars tend to downplay the significance of
cases to understanding criminal law.201 Such animosity is nothing
new, and in fact dates back to a surge of frustration with the
common law that peaked in the 1930s.202 At the forefront of such
critiques were legal realist scholars like Karl Llewellyn who
believed that law should reflect social realities – not ancient
doctrines – and should rely on empirical studies in social science
for guidance.203 Though Llewellyn concentrated his reform efforts
on rationalizing commercial law, his general animosity towards the
common law was shared by scholars in the criminal law realm as
199
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well, including Columbia law professor Herbert Wechsler.204 To
Wechsler’s mind, the common law actually contributed to a narrow
judicial mindset that threatened Roosevelt’s early, ambitious New
Deal programs.205
Wechsler’s pro-New Deal sentiment inspired him to join
Columbia colleague Jerome Michael in drafting a new kind of
criminal law casebook in 1940.206 Unlike older books, Joseph
Henry Beale’s classic 1890s text among them, Wechsler and
Michael deliberately reduced the number of cases in their book,
substituting in their place extensive notes that drew from law
review articles, philosophical treatises, and social science
studies.207 To Wechsler’s mind, such an approach helped to
produce a new kind of student, one liberated from the “closedsystem” approach of the common law, and eager to think critically
of the manner in which social science could contribute to racial
legal reform.208
In part because of the success of his casebook, Wechsler
received an invitation from the American law Institute to serve as
Reporter for a new, model criminal code that would draw heavily
from advances in social science to reform ancient common law
doctrines.209 Wechsler and Michael had already sought ways to
improve such doctrines, particularly in the law of homicide, hoping
to rationalize redundancies, tailor sentencing, and clarify confusing
common law rules.210 Over the course of the next decade, from
1952 to 1962, the American Law Institute relied on a series of
experts to reform almost every area of criminal law, substituting
the common law’s traditional emphasis on retribution and
community conscience with a more scientific emphasis on
treatmentism and the reduction of criminal harm.211 Though
Wechsler himself retained an interest in the utility of desert, many
of the Code’s new provisions reflected a very different approach,
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located far from local community sentiment, usages, and
customs.212
Though at first glance similar to Llewellyn’s UCC, the
Model Penal Code’s rejection of local custom made it and the
Uniform Commercial Code profoundly different. Despite his
interest in modernism, for example, Karl Llewellyn kept local
custom at the center of his mind, staying true to the realist maxim
that legal reform should draw inspiration not from abstract
principles but “the trials of experience.”213 Though just as opposed
to the common law as Wechsler, in other words, Llewellyn
retained an appreciation for the fact that judge-made law also
included within it significant “folk artifacts,” and useful “working
rules” that had “proven their worth over time.”214 This led him to
articulate a distinction between the “grand” or valuable portions of
the common law, from the less valuable “formal” aspects.215 To
Llewellyn’s mind, it was the legislator’s job to “take the good,
practical folkways” of the common law, meanwhile rejecting its
“outmoded” facets.216
Central to Llewellyn’s belief in the value of folkways was
the discipline of anthropology, a field that inspired one of his best
known works, The Cheyenne Way.217 In that book, Llewellyn
extolled those aspects of tribal behavior that reflected sensible
practices developed from the ground-up, arguing that written law
worked best when it tracked local custom.218 To Llewellyn’s
mind, the business community reflected another type of tribe, like
the Cheyenne, that had established its own customs governing
commercial transactions, an insight that guided his preparation of
the Uniform Commercial Code.219
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By contrast, the drafters of the MPC downplayed the
significance of folkways to criminal law reform.220 Rather than
presume that criminal law should be “what judges do” – a Realist
maxim – the ALI drafters spent considerable amounts of time
focused on what judges had done wrong, and what real, expertdriven reform should look like.221 Though ALI Reporter Herbert
Wechsler kept custom in mind, the inspiration for much of the
MPC lay not in local practice but behavioral science –
psychological and sociological work done on treatmentist goals
like rehabilitation and deterrence.222
The MPC’s break from the common law sparked a seachange in criminal law pedagogy as scholars moved to present the
MPC not as an evolved form of the common law, or even a
repository for the best of common law rules, but a rational,
ultimately superior alternative.223 Not long after the MPC was
completed, for example, a new generation of criminal law scholars
led by Sanford H. Kadish began drafting casebooks heavily
influenced by Wechsler and Michael, even to the point that they
included the MPC at the end of their books as an example of a
rational code that could be compared to archaic common law.224
Once states began to actually adopt portions of the MPC,
criminal law scholars then began to divide the country into two
kinds of states: those that adopted the MPC, and the rest.225
Underlying this practice was, of course, a larger set of normative,
even political assumptions about the nature of criminal law
generally. To the younger, reform-minded generation, MPC states
were in fact more progressive, more scientific, and less likely to
cave to popular demands for retribution and revenge.226 Such
commercial law, Llewellyn drew inspiration from turn-of-the-century
anthropologist William Graham Sumner, who posited that “folkways,” or local
practices, were always more powerful than “law ways,” or written rules.
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states inspired the hope that a rational criminal code could be
implemented across the country, one that ignored irrational calls
for increased punishment, execution, and redundant offenses.227
Yet, between innovations in behavioral science and legal
change rested an entire strata of thought far removed from the
realm of rational inquiry, a realm that Lawrence Friedman has
since called “popular legal culture” inhabited by “popular ideas,
attitudes, values, and opinions” regarding law what the law is.228
Acknowledging the importance of popular legal culture was not
something that devotees of the MPC considered central, to their
own detriment.229 One of the best examples of this was the failure
of MPC proponents Sanford Kadish and Herbert Packer to reform
California’s penal code.230 Asked by California’s Joint Legislative
Committee to improve criminal law in the golden state, Kadish and
Packer spent several years on the drafting of a new criminal code,
importing many of the innovations recommended by the MPC.231
Though many such reforms would likely have passed legislative
muster, Kadish and Packer endorsed several changes that flew in
the face of customary criminal law in California, including the
decriminalization of certain sexual behaviors, the expansion of the
insanity defense, and the liberalization of marijuana laws.232 When
state Republicans read the commission’s recommendation that
possession and sale of less than one pound of marijuana be
considered a misdemeanor, for example, they reacted “with such
emotional indignation that all avenues for a thoughtful interchange
of points of view were quickly closed.”233 Not long thereafter,
“the acting project director was informed by telephone that the
chairman of the Joint Legislative Committee had discharged all of
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the members of the staff and ordered the project halted at once.”234
Though Kadish and Packer wrote a letter protesting the decision,
no new commission was appointed and California’s criminal code
remained largely unchanged for the remainder of the twentieth
century. 235
Though Kadish later blamed “conservatives” for killing
criminal reform in California, he himself did little to make sure
that the committee’s suggestions were in line with what most
voters believed, even confessing that the academic members of the
staff ran the committee meetings as “post-graduate seminars.”236
Had Kadish and his colleagues approached such seminars in a
more anthropological way, focusing on the local norms of
California voters, they might have been able to develop strategic
concessions – much like Wechsler did in New York – saving
reform.237
Sanford Kadish’s failure in California underscores the
importance of conveying the link between culture and criminal law
to students. Though liberalizing marijuana laws may have
appeared non-controversial at the time, code reformers failed to
accurately assess the power of conservative politics in California in
the 1960s, undoubtedly substituting liberal positions on marijuana
use common in Berkeley and Palo Alto for more conservative
positions in rural, working class demographics across the state.238
Further, code reformers may have fared better had they remained
more closely attuned to trends in state politics, particularly a
pronounced shift towards conservatism mid-decade, as voters
recoiled at urban rioting, anti-war protest, and Berkeley’s filthy,
free-speech movement.239
While criminal law courses can probably never incorporate
the full scope of state and local politics into their syllabi, methods
of emphasizing the link between criminal law and culture
nevertheless remain.240 For example, one way to convey the link
between law and culture is to delve into the particulars of state law,
234

Arthur H. Sherry, Criminal Law Revision in California 4 U. MICH. J. L.
REFORM 441 (1971).
235
Sanford Kadish & Herbert Packer to Senator Donald L. Grunsky, Sept. 24,
1969, Letters, 22 STANFORD L. REV. 160 (1969).
236
Interview with Sanford H. Kadish, Alexander F. and May T. Morrison
Professor of Law, Emeritus, University of California, Berkeley, in Berkeley,
California (May 19, 2008)(on file with the author).
237
Anders Walker, American Oresteia: Herbert Wechsler, the Model Penal
Code, and the Uses of Revenge, 2009 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 1017 (2009).
238
JAMES T. CAREY, THE COLLEGE DRUG SCENE (1968); JAY STEVENS,
STORMING HEAVEN: LSD AND THE AMERICAN DREAM (1988).
239
ANTHONY J. LUKAS, DON’T SHOOT – WE ARE YOUR CHILDREN! (1971);
GEOFFREY HODGSON, AMERICA IN OUR TIME (1978).
240
Chad Flanders, The One-State Solution to Teaching Criminal Law, OHIO
STATE J. OF CRIM. L. (forthcoming 2010).

39

showing how certain states adopted portions of the MPC, but
rejected others.241 Another is to look at courts, focusing on how
judicial opinions modified those sections of the Model Penal Code
that were adopted. True to its anthropological bent, the drafters of
the UCC did just this, setting apart a special organ for publishing
judicial modifications of the Code.242 However, nothing similar
exists for the MPC, leaving most students blind to the manner in
which it has interacted with local state cultures. This has led to a
problem that anthropologist Clifford Geertz identified with topdown, philosophical approaches to studying society generally,
namely the problem with extracting “the general from the
particular” and then setting the particular “aside as detail,
illustration, background, or qualification.”243 To Geertz, such
moves yield a relatively narrow understanding of “the very
difference we need to explore.”244
Geertz’s attention to local difference warrants closer
thought by criminal law scholars and teachers. This is because
students suffer at least two distinct harms when they are not
provided with a clear view of how local culture impacts criminal
law, including the MPC. First, failing to instruct students on
judicial modifications of the MPC, or what this article calls the
new common law, renders them less prone to understanding what,
precisely the law forbids, a problem that scholars like Paul H.
Robinson have argued is a serous concern.245 Two, failing to
instruct students on the new common law prevents them from
seeing the critical role that criminal lawmaking can play in
quieting community outrage, a phenomenon that criminal law
scholars call the utility of desert.246 Though scholars revile
redundant criminal provisions, for example, such provisions are
often important responses to particular moments of community
outrage.247 As scholars Paul Robinson and Michael T. Cahill note,
for example, “[i]f there is a series of drive-by shootings, or a
particularly scary home invasion case, or some carjackings, a
common response is to create special offenses for each of these
241
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particular kinds of conduct, even though they are already fully
criminalized and, where possible, prosecuted.”248 While both
Robinson and Cahill find such behavior reprehensible, even they
agree that the public are affected by such moves, arguably
precluding average voters from doing even more serious damage.
What, skeptics might ask, might voters do? Citizens
deprived of immediate responses to gruesome crimes may retaliate
by electing tough-on-crime representatives who end up imposing
harsher penalties on all offenders.249 Outraged citizens may also
refuse to channel public funds into the defense of the accused, a
serious problem for public defenders across the United States.250
Though downplayed by criminal law scholars, in other words, the
problem of voter outrage might actually be one of the most serious
– yet underestimated – forces acting on America’s criminal justice
system, even today.

VI. CONCLUSION
Though criminal law scholars continue to divide American
jurisdictions into Model Penal Code and common law states, it is
not clear that such divisions retain any real pedagogical value. As
this article has shown, no state in the Union continues to follow the
ancient common law of England, nor does any state exist without a
criminal code. Indeed, out of the sixteen states that did not adopt
the Model Penal Code – a move that has since relegated them into
the common law category – none adhere to anything that might
remotely be called English common law.
As we have seen, all common law states have long since
codified their criminal law, reserving the enforcement of ancient
common law crimes to “reception statutes.”251 Yet, the use of such
statutes is exceedingly rare, confined to idiosyncratic, nineteenthcentury-era offenses like “being a common scold,” and “burning a
248
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body in a cellar furnace.”252 Archaic at best, these types of
offenses hardly warrant the sustained attention of first year law
students.253
Even the argument that certain states codified common law
terms is hardly a justification for continuing the common law
divide.254 As this article illustrates, most states have legislatively
altered what might once have been considered common law
offenses, creating an entirely new form of American criminal
law.255 To take just a few of the most glaring examples, all
American states save one (South Carolina) unanimously rejected
British rules of homicide by dividing murder into degrees.256 All
American states (including South Carolina), then went on to grade
forcible felonies, independent of British sources.257 Such grading
alone sets American criminal law apart, even making it a model for
reforms later enacted in the United Kingdom.258
Further, classic common law terms like malice
aforethought – the bane of first year criminal law students –
suffered a dramatic decline in use in the United States over the
course of the Twentieth Century, as states enacted their own,
unique requirements of mental state.259 To date, only six states out
of fifty continue to employ malice aforethought as an indicator of
first degree murder, hardly enough to warrant sustained attention in
criminal law courses, even at national schools.260
The same can be said of conduct and attendant
circumstance rules. To take just a few examples, conduct rules in
classic common law crimes such as rape have been fundamentally
altered in the United States, pushing them away from their English
roots. 261 North Carolina – often considered one of the most
traditional common law states – actually pioneered the
liberalization of force requirements, allowing juries to infer force
where only a threat existed. 262
The occlusion of cultural influences on criminal law is
perhaps one of the greatest reasons for ending the mythology of the
common law state.263 Perhaps no better example of this exists than
California’s drive-by-shooting statute, designating anyone who
252
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discharges a “firearm from a motor vehicle intentionally at another
person outside of the vehicle” guilty of first degree murder.264
Rather than a reflection of ancient common law doctrine, this
statute represents a direct product of local criminal culture in
California.265 Understanding the manner in which such local
cultures impact criminal law is considerably more important to
students than regurgitations of lost common law doctrines.
Just as the notion of the common law state has become
increasingly anachronistic, so too has the conceit of the Model
Penal Code jurisdiction.266 Though thirty four states adopted
portions of the MPC, no state adopted all of it.267 Further, even
those states that adopted significant sections of the Code still
retained key aspects of their old laws.268 For example, the MPC’s
recommendation that inchoate crimes be punished the same as
completed crimes won no supporters.269 Neither did the MPC’s
elimination of felony murder, nor its elimination of the overt act
requirement for conspiracies to commit violent felonies.270
Much of the MPC’s failure to be adopted in toto was its
incongruity with local, cultural values.271 One of the most glaring
examples of this was the MPC’s treatment of statutory rape.272
While MPC drafters felt comfortable reducing the age of victims to
ten, state legislatures balked, refusing to let go of traditional
attitudes regarding sex and children.273
The same held true for murder. Convinced that qualifiers
like premeditation and deliberation had been rendered meaningless
by courts, MPC drafters de-graded the crime, only to find that first
degree murder enjoyed a strong cultural currency.274 In state after
state, legislatures rejected the Code’s mono-murder rule, retaining
first degree murder for instances where the public demanded
retribution, but second degree where defendants proved
sympathetic.275 That no ostensible difference existed between the
two, especially after premeditation and deliberation could be
formed in an instant, proved, in the end, irrelevant.
Another locus of cultural resistance emerged around the
death penalty. Though personally opposed to capital punishment,
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MPC Reporter Herbert Wechsler struggled to remain sensitive to
popular support for the penalty while implementing the MPC in
New York.276 As a result, New York’s Temporary Commission
did away with the mandatory death penalty for all forms of first
degree murder, but retained capital punishment for the rare cases
where a defendant murdered a police officer or prison guard.277
Though such concessions helped the revisions get through in 1972,
state legislators proved unable to resist the temptation to add more
exceptions to the rule every year after that, ultimately resulting in a
triptych of local panics over contract killings, witness eliminations,
judicial assassinations, and serial killer scares.278
Even as state legislatures proceeded to alter the Model
Penal Code – as happened in New York – so too did state courts
intervene, engendering nothing less than a new common law.279
Perhaps the most devastating example of such law was the judicial
elimination of the MPC’s expectation that prosecutors choose only
one mental state per offense.280 As Herbert Wechsler put it,
“[s]ince a particular crime must actually be intended, the charge
must be precise and must not permit the jury to convict the actor
on one of several mental states.”281 Judges disagreed. In all thirtyfour states that adopted the Code, judges made a mockery of its
MPC provisions by allowing prosecutors to proceed on a string of
alternate possible mental states for the same offense.282
Judges also tinkered with the offenses themselves.283 In
some MPC states, judges ignored the MPC’s order that accomplice
liability not be ascribed based on the natural and probable
consequences of an accomplice’s actions.284 In other states, judges
simply created new rules that replaced natural and probable
consequences, holding for example that accomplices could be
found guilty for “those crimes which [they] could reasonably
anticipate would be a part of that conduct.”285
When new rules did not work, judges returned to old ones,
infusing the MPC with local law. For example, even though
Arkansas adopted the MPC’s notion of extreme emotional
disturbance – a defense that replaced the heat of passion defense to
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first degree murder – state judges quickly read old rules into the
new law, requiring that there be no cooling off time between the
provocation and the criminal act.286 Likewise, Illinois judges
avoided the MPC’s order that accomplices not be held liable based
on the natural and probable consequences of their actions, holding
instead that “any acts in furtherance” of a “common criminal
design,” constituted grounds for prosecution.287
Secreted over almost a fifty year period from 1962 to 2010,
judicial modifications of Model Penal Code rules embody nothing
less than a new common law.288 That casebooks and treatises do
not focus on this law is mystifying. However, even the most proMPC criminal law theorists have begun to doubt the continued
relevance of the code.289 According to criminal law scholar
Markus Dubber, an ALI enthusiast, the Model Penal Code
“belongs to a bygone era of American penal law.”290 Built on the
twin theories of deterrence and treatment, Dubber continues, the
Code “no longer enjoys the broad consensus it might have had in
the 1950s.”291
Indeed it does not. Though criminal law casebooks
continue to present the MPC as an innovative, recent reform, it is
rapidly approaching its fiftieth birthday. At its inception half a
century ago, it dovetailed nicely with prevailing trends towards
modernism in law – a Benthamite moment during which rationality
and science eclipsed history and anthropology.292 However, the
devolution of the Model Penal Code in the latter half of the
twentieth suggests that history and culture may be regaining lost
ground.293 Indeed, the very criticisms of state codes advanced by
scholars – that they are incoherent, sedimentary, even redundant –
only confirms the Burkean critique of Bentham, namely that law
itself cannot be understood by logical principles and scientific
rules, but requires a close study of the history and culture of a
particular society.294
Judicial opinions and state statutes provide just such a
study. Though criminal law scholar Markus Dubber has declared
that “[t]he age of the common penal law is over,” and that “[p]enal
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law is now made in codes by legislators, not in court opinions by
judges,” even a cursory look at the manner in which courts have
modified Model Penal Code provisions, or what this article calls
the “new common law,” suggests this is incorrect.295 In fact,
criminal law may be enjoying a renascence of new common law
principles. How? While the mid-point of the Twentieth century
witnessed a spike in modernist thought, of which the MPC was a
product, the 21st Century looks to be a much different era, marked
by a return to “historical and prescriptive modes of thought.”296
Perhaps the biggest example of this is the recent surge of interest in
empirical legal studies, an anti-philosophical inquiry bent on
understanding the law as it is, not as it might, or even should be.
Some of the MPC’s most fervent supporters understood
this. As much as Wechsler resisted the common law, for example,
he never lost sight of local community norms and local, cultural
values. While serving on New York’s Temporary Commission to
revise its Penal Law in 1963, for example, Wechsler consistently
prodded the Committee to consider local attitudes. Wechsler’s
concern that criminal law coincide with community values is often
lost in criminal law courses, particularly as teachers struggle to
maintain the false dichotomy between common law and Model
Penal Code states. Setting aside this dichotomy is vital if criminal
law scholars want to bring the course back to earth for their
students. Currently, simple comparisons between MPC and
common law states obscure the manner in which statutory law and
case law intertwine, even as they leave students missing the close
relationship between criminal codes and local norms. By contrast,
focusing on the New Common Law enables students to see how
even the most scientific of codes ultimately finds itself bending,
and being bent, to suit judicial will.
One final point is worth mentioning. Though the impact of
popular will on criminal statutes has been criticized by law
scholars like Paul Robinson and William J. Stuntz, criminal law’s
close tie to popular democracy remains unavoidable.297 Not
emphasizing this to students can lead to dire results, among them a
recurrent tendency to downplay the significance of local voters,
and also to miss important cultural formations that may or may not
make certain litigation strategies, or reform attempts, unworkable.
Perhaps no better example of this exists than the failure of Model
Penal Code enthusiasts like Sanford Kadish to successfully reform
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California’s criminal code in the 1960s – a burden the state bears
to this day.
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